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Abstract: Grievance and reduced opportunity costs are two popular ideas within the 
civil war literature to explain participation in violent rebellion. We test both 
hypotheses at the village-level using data on recruitment activities during the civil war 
in Burundi. We use historical data on violent attacks in 1972 and 1988 as a proxy for 
grievance. The cross-sectional analyses report no effect of grievance on the likelihood 
of recruitment. By contrast, they do show tentative support for the idea that reduced 
opportunity costs may promote recruitment. Villages that had above mean incidents of 
‘insufficient rain’ were more likely to have recruitment activities than others. We find 
similar results when we use recall information on recruitment to construct a 13-year 
panel. Negative income shocks through adverse weather conditions are a strong 
predictor of recruitment. By contrast we find no effect of commodity price shocks. 
These findings are consistent with a recent conclusion from literature: commodity 
price shocks show no robust relationship with civil war violence while weather shocks 
do. 
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1. Introduction 
The empirical analysis of the causes and consequences of civil war is the subject of 
study in a growing literature in economics and political science. This may in part be 
attributed to the empirical fact that since the end of the Second World War, intrastate 
violence is far more common than international wars. Of the 34 armed conflicts listed 
in the Armed Conflict Dataset for 2001, all but one were civil wars (Gleditsch et al., 
2002).  Despite increased scholarship on the topic the causes of civil warfare are still 
not well understood. The vast majority of the civil war research consists of cross-
country analyses. While instructive, they can only explain part of the puzzle at best. 
They for example gloss over regional, household, or individual conditions by 
construction. That is, it cannot satisfactorily explain why some people actively 
participate in fighting war while the majority does not (Blattman and Miguel, 2009).  
 
Theories about why people participate in violent rebellion date back to the classic 
sociological literature on agrarian revolutions (Scott, 1976; Gurr, 1971). These 
theories center on the idea that grievances such as frustrations about economic or 
political inequality induce rebellion. While some economists and political scientists 
subscribe to this view, alternative sets of mechanisms have been identified. For 
example, these include the idea that individuals who join warring factions are 
motivated by private gains that only accrue to those that actively participate in the 
fighting. Incentives may stem from wages, looting opportunities, promises of future 
rewards or to be protected from violence from the rebel group itself as well as other 
fighting faction(s) (e.g. Olson, 1965; Lichbach, 1994; Grossman, 1991; 1992; Besley 
and Persson 2008; Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2008).  
 
In recent years scholars have used regional or individual level data to empirically test 
these seemingly rival explanations. A prime example of the latter is the study by 
Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) on Sierra Leone. They test to what extent 
grievances, selective incentives, and (or) social sanctions can explain participation in 
both rebel groups as well as local militias (counterinsurgents who want to preserve the 
status quo). Others use regional or district-level data to investigate under which 
conditions people are motivated to pick up arms. Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan (2004), 
analyse local conflicts in Indonesia, and find a positive correlation between violence 
and unemployement, as well as violence and income inequality. Do and Iyer (2007) 
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examine determinants of the intensity of civil war in Nepal, and find that higher rates 
of poverty and lower levels of literacy prior to the outbreak of the Maoist insurgency 
are correlated with greater conflict intensity within the district. Dube and Vargas 
(2007) present evidence for Colombia on the mechanism linking the price of export 
commodities to violence. They show that a drop in the price of coffee substantially 
increased the incidence and intensity of the civil war in coffee-intensive areas, 
whereas an increase in the price of oil has a similar effect. They attribute this to the 
lowering of the opportunity cost of joining a rebel movement (via depressed wages) in 
the case of coffee and on increase in local state revenue in the case of oil.  
 
Our paper is similar in spirit to studies of the latter type. We use cross-sectional and 
constructed panel data from a sample of Burundian villages to examine the 
determinants of recruitment activities during the Burundi civil war. Our contribution 
is twofold: (i) we use novel data from large-scale nationally representative household 
and community surveys to examine village-level determinants of recruitment; and (ii) 
we complement the cross-sectional findings with (recall-based) panel data analyses to 
examine whether variation in recruitment activities systematically varies with 
changing economic conditions. We consider variation in the producer price of coffee 
and negative rainfall shocks to probe into the issue of when the risk of rebellion is at 
its peak.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the course of the civil war in 
Burundi. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 and Section 5 present the empirical 
results. Section 6 discusses and concludes.  
 
2 The Burundi civil war  
Burundi has until recently been involved in long and a brutal civil war that left 
hundreds of thousands of people dead, maimed or displaced. Massive bloodshed took 
place in 1972, where the armed forces slaughtered between 80.000 and 200.000 
(mostly wealthy and intellectual) Hutu. In 1988, responding to a similar uprising 
where several thousand Tutsi were killed, “peace” was restored by the government 
forces killing 20.000 Hutu (HRW, 1998). Although no formal investigation into the 
1988 massacres was allowed, president Buyoya sought for means to reconcile Hutu 
and Tutsi rather than controlling the Hutu majority by repression. Several Hutu were 
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appointed to government positions. Many Tutsi however viewed loss of ruling power 
and the resulting massacres in neighboring Rwanda as a warning sign for what would 
happen if they started sharing power with the Hutu. They therefore resisted Buyoya’s 
reforms with unsuccessful coups in 1989 and 1992. Despite internal opposition, 
elections were held in 1993 and on July 1, Melchior Ndadaye became Burundi’s first 
Hutu president. The newly installed president made important changes in the local 
administration and planned to reform the almost exclusively Tutsi army to increase 
ethnic and regional diversity (HRW, 1998). The attempts to reform however brutally 
ended with the killing of Ndadaye in October 1993.   
 
The eruption of Hutu-led violence following the killing of the president was retaliated 
by massive indiscriminate violence by the government forces. HRW reports: “The 
army responded with clashes on Hutu making no distinction between communities 
involved in violence against Tutsi and those that were not. In a period of only a few 
weeks anywhere from 30.000 to 50.000 people were slain, roughly an equal number 
from each ethnic group.” Uvin (1999) elaborates: “On October 21, 1993, low-level 
soldiers killed President Ndadaye and other dignitaries after only three months in 
office, with at least passive support from the highest levels of the army. Popular 
unrest then erupted throughout Burundi, and thousands of Tutsi were brutally killed, 
especially in the north and center. The army moved in to restore order, killing 
thousands of Hutu in the process. In total, it is estimated that 50,000 to 100,000 
persons were murdered in the three months after the coup; one million fled the 
country; and hundreds of thousands were internally displaced.” The scope and 
intensity of the violence was unprecedented and resulted in a gruesome civil war that 
lasted sixteen years, leaving the country and its citizens in ruins.  
 
3 Data  
3.1 Sample design and questionnaire 
We use the 1998 and 2007 Burundi Priority Surveys including household and village 
level variables. The Burundi Priority Survey 1998 was implemented by the Burundi 
Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (ISTEEBU) in cooperation with the 
World Bank. The research was undertaken in all provinces across the country to be 
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nationally representative and took place between October 1998 and March 1999.4 In 
2007, ISTEEBU collected the second wave of data for a subsample of the 1998 
households in cooperation with a team of academics.  
 
Household and individual data were collected foremost on socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics, income, consumption and assets, trust, social capital and 
subjective welfare measures. The community questionnaire entailed questions about 
infrastructure, violence, village-level clashes, and recruitment. For the community 
questionnaire we relied on a set of 'key experts' often the village level leader 
accompanied by elders.  
 
The questionnaires were designed in French but interviews were conducted in 
Kirundi. We trained 65 interviewers during a one-week training during which we 
improved the questionnaire. The questionnaire was pilot tested in an out of sample 
village and final corrections were made. 50 interviewers were selected in a 
competitive exam that included a case study on household composition, consumption 
and production as well as a range of questions on research ethics. Each team of five 
interviewers was supervised by a team leader. Two out of five team members were 
women.  
 
With the 2007 round we targeted 1.000 households out of the 1998 sample that 
encompassed 3908 rural households in sixteen provinces. We randomly selected a 
subsample of 100 out of the 390 clusters (villages or ‘collines’ in French). In each 
cluster we then interviewed all households that were part of the 1998 sample 10 per 
cluster). Of the initial 1.000 households we were able to re-interview 872, having an 
attrition rate of less than 13%.  This is reasonable considering that a civil war was 
going on in the years between the survey rounds; causing many deaths and massive 
displacements and hence led to an increased chance that entire households had 
completely disappeared.5  
                                                 
4 Due to on‐going violence in the provinces of Makamba, Bubanza and Bujumbura rural no ‘second wave’ 
interviews were undertaken in these areas. In Makamba no interviews were held in 1998 either while in 
Bubanza and Bujumbura rural only a very small sample of households was interviewed then as a result of 
the war.     
5 Alderman et al., (2000) discusses the problem of attrition. They report attrition rates for Sub‐Sahara 
African countries up to 50%. On the other hand, they find that coefficient estimates are not significantly 
affected by attrition. Since we use village‐level data we do not worry about attrition here.  
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The high rate of successful tracing was influenced by at the least the following three 
factors; first, the team of researchers spent much time to train local interviewers in 
tracing household members who were interviewed in 1998. If a household was not 
found the interviewer would approach neighbors and other people from the colline to 
get information as detailed as possible about the household, i.e. why it moved, and 
where it moved to. Our interviewers often managed to obtain information on, 
sometimes distinctly different, reasons for moving of the household head and the 
remaining members respectively. Second, the country is very small and people live 
isolated at the collines, where everyone knows about each others’ whereabouts. Third, 
in Burundi the pressure of land is extraordinary high (population density is the second 
highest on the African continent, after Rwanda). As a result people may have only 
have fled at the very last minute, if there was no other option, and return immediately 
after the violence as to ensure their claim to land. Most often, our survey team would 
find the households in the same location as in 1998.  
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
This section describes first how key dependent and independent variables were 
constructed. These variables include recruitment, grievance, rainfall shocks, and 
ethnic heterogeneity. The second part presents the sample means for the dependent 
and all independent variables. 
 
The recruitment variable was based on information from our community survey. The 
survey question asked whether recruitment took place in the village in a given year 
and whether recruitment was voluntary or not.6 Unfortunately, the survey did not ask 
for the number of recruits for each year. We thus define recruitment as a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if recruitment activities had taken place in the village in 
a given year and 0 otherwise.  For grievance we rely on anecdotal evidence from 
Human Rights Watch reports (2003) and Lemarchand (1994) who describe the events 
and locations of violence in 1972 and 1988 respectively. Rainfall shocks are based on 
data from our household survey. The specific question read as follows (translated 
from French):  
                                                 
6 In sharp contrast to for example recruitment during the civil war in Uganda, Sierra Leone or Sudan, 
recruitment in Burundi had a predominantly ‘voluntary’ character, meaning that people were rarely 
abducted or taken by physical or mental force. 
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Could you please tell me if your household experienced shocks of insufficient rainfall 
between 1998 and 2007?  
The enumerator would write down the answer (yes or no) in a table that listed the 
years. Rainfall shocks can plausibly be regarded as covariate shocks in this context. 
Levels of rainfall do not vary within villages in Burundi because of their small size. 
We therefore aggregate the household responses up to the village level. To reduce 
measurement error, at least half of the sampled households within the village had to 
indicate ‘yes’ for a given shock in a given year, to be assigned 1 (occurrence). One 
may however argue that variation in reporting may reflect variation in activities. That 
is, households that have for example non-agricultural jobs may not consider 
‘insufficient rainfall’ as a shock. They would hence not report it as a shock. If 
underreporting of rainfall shocks exhibits a systematic relation with for example 
village level wealth our results would be biased. The data however do not support this 
interpretation. More than 95 percent of the sample households rely on rain-fed 
agriculture for their income. Rainfall shocks would therefore plausibly affect (nearly) 
all households in the village.       
 
Thus, S jt =1 if sijt ≥ 0.5n
i=1
n∑ , and 0 otherwise, where sijt  is the response to a shock in 
year t  by household i  in village j . We subsequently sum over t  to obtain the total 
number of rainfall shocks for a given village j   in the period 1998-2005. We then 
create a binary variable that took the value 1 if the village had more than the sample 
mean incidents of ‘too low rainfall’ and 0 otherwise. 
 
In the panel data analysis we use a continuous measure of regional rainfall shocks.  
The constructed variable here reflects the annual deviation from long-run average 
rainfall levels. Regional rainfall levels are measured at weather stations across the 
country (16 in total).   
 
Given the important ethnic dimension of the conflict, we also want to control for 
ethnic heterogeneity. The Burundi government however had a very stringent policy 
after the war with respect to collecting ethnic identity information and the original 
questions had to be removed from the survey. We therefore cannot explicitly control 
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for ethnic composition here but use the percentage votes for Ndadaye as a proxy. The 
intuition is as follows: Melchior Ndadaye was the first elected Hutu president and 
likely to be most popular among Hutu-dominated villages. We therefore assume that a 
variation in percentage votes in favor of Ndadaye can plausibly resemble the ethnic 
mix within a village. We also partially tested for the validity of this assumption when 
we had new household data from 2009 at our disposal.  
 
During our last visit to Burundi in spring 2009, we found that regulations were 
somewhat relaxed. As part of a new data collection effort we selected a subsample of 
35 villages for new fieldwork applying economic games (see Voors et al, 2009). 
Household and community surveys now included a question on ethnic origin. We 
could thus check for 35 villages whether the percentage votes for Ndadaye indeed 
approximated the ethnic composition of a particular village. We found the correlation 
coefficient to be positive, reasonably high (0.48), and strongly significant at p=0.00. 
Although imperfect nonetheless, since there may have been changes in composition 
since the war started, it was the best alternative available. Besides, the 2009 data 
revealed that changes in composition were quite marginal (values for pre-war ethnic 
composition were based on recall so we could compare).  
 
Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of all variables. 
 
4 Cross-section models  
We start our empirical analysis by testing whether historical grievances can explain 
variation in recruitment activities between 1993 and 2005. Table 3 presents the 
results. Column (1) reports the unconditional correlation between grievances from 
violent attacks in the past and the probability of recruitment during the civil war. The 
coefficient has the ‘wrong’ sign (positive) and is marginally significant at 10%. The 
significance is clearly due to omitted variables; adding controls in (2) dramatically 
improves the models’ fit and the coefficient for grievance is now insignificant. The 
coefficient for coffee growing regions is marginally significant suggesting that 
recruitment was more likely in these areas. Our proxy for Hutu-dominated villages is 
a strong significant predictor of recruitment. This is unsurprising given that Burundi’s 
rebels were nearly all Hutu.  
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Column (3) and (4) present the results for the alternative idea that low opportunity 
costs drives farmers into the hands of rebel organizations.  
 
Contrary to our grievances variable, we now find a positive and significant effect on 
the likelihood that this village had recruitment activities between 1993 and 2005. The 
positive effect remains when controls and our proxy variable for grievances (column 
5) are included. The final column (6) includes the number of villagers that died as a 
result of violent attacks by the warring factions. Note that this represents the total 
number of people in the village that died as a result of the war. The coefficient is very 
small but significant. Cross-sectional estimates are however prone to omitted 
variables. We there do not draw any firm conclusions yet but proceed with the panel 
data analyses.      
 
5 Panel data models 
5.1. Commodity price shocks and recruitment 
In this section we test the hypothesis that an exogenous shock in export commodity 
prices (coffee) is a positive predictor of recruitment.7 Income from coffee is an 
important source of revenue for coffee farmers because they receive a substantial sum 
(20 to 30% of their monetary income) once a year that can be used to cover expenses 
on durable goods, house construction, health and education. This sum is then injected 
in the local economy with effects far beyond the coffee sector. For years however, 
Burundian farmers have received a bad deal from their government (see table 1). 
Compared to neighboring countries (e.g. Uganda and Rwanda), Burundian coffee 
producers have received very low prices for their produce. OCIBU (Burundi’s state-
run coffee agency) set the producer price annually and was in control of marketing 
and export. Figure 1 shows that the producer price of coffee set by the Burundian 
government is to some extent unrelated to the world market price of coffee.  
 
The binary variable for recruitment activities may arguably be too coarse to reveal a 
possible systematic relation with changes in coffee prices. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of detailed recruitment data, it could still be informative. The producer price 
                                                 
7 We cannot test grievances here as we did in our cross‐section analyses with a (time‐invariant) constructed 
variable based historical data on violent attacks in the 1907s and 1980s. In some of the panel specifications 
we however included “number of deaths” in the previous year as a measure of grievance. On a more 
speculative note, ‘votes for Ndadaye’ could proxy Hutu grievances towards the former Tutsi government.   
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is related to the farmer’s opportunity costs of joining the rebels. We therefore expect 
high producer prices to be negatively related to recruitment activities. The negative 
effect may however extend to other households within the community, as low 
producer prices will distort the local (village) economy and hence spill over to other 
households that do not grow coffee. Simply put, farmers then have less money to 
spend on other products sold at the village market and hence affect other households 
as well.  
 
The panel models allow us to include village and year fixed effects. This is commonly 
considered to be a powerful technique to mitigate concerns about omitted variable 
bias, giving it a distinct advantage over the cross-sectional analyses. We fit 
conditional logit models on our dataset. If t  is relatively large, the conditional 
maximum likelihood estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal (Maddala, 
1987). The model is formulated in terms of the underlying latent model: 
* *jt t j j j t jtr p coffee Xγ β α λ ε= + + + +       
 (1) 
1jtr =    if * 0jtr >         
  
0jtr =   if * 0jtr ≤  
The disadvantage of fixed-effect logit models is that villages that did not have any 
recruitment over the given period drop out in the estimation. The sample is thus 
consequently reduced to about half of the original sample. We report results with the 
random effects estimator as well. One reason for that is to compare the sensitivity of 
our results in the smaller sample to that of the full sample. The other reason is to shed 
more light on other village characteristics that could explain participation. The 
dependent variable jtr   is a binary variable taking the value 1 if village j had 
recruitment activities in year t , and 0 otherwise. Our key variable of interest is the 
interaction between the producer price p and a time-invariant variable jcoffee that 
denotes coffee-growing areas. The latter has been constructed on altitude ranges that 
are most suitable for growing coffee (1800-2500m). jX is a series of  other control 
variables, jα  are N village-specific unknown parameters, tλ are the year fixed effects 
and jtε is the error term. Naturally, the time-invariant controls jX drop out in the 
fixed effects estimations.   
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In Table 4 we present the results for changes in coffee prices. Column (1) reports 
random effects estimates for our key variables of interest. Although the interaction is 
negative, it is not significant at conventional levels (p =0.163). The variable 
measuring the producer price of coffee drops out with year dummies. Its value does 
not vary across villages but is set by the central government and hence captured by the 
year fixed effects in our estimation.  
 
Column (2) presents random effects estimates including the relevant village controls. 
Again, the coefficient on the interaction term has the ‘right’ sign, the p-value drops to 
less than 0.12 but the effect is not strong enough to reject the null hypothesis that the 
effect is 0. Perhaps striking, we also do not find any of the village level controls to be 
a significant predictor of recruitment, safe for a marginal positive correlation with 
distance to the nearest health center. Column (3) is essentially the same as (2) except 
that we now include the percentage of votes Ndadaye. This does not change the 
results.  
 
Column (4) presents the preferred village fixed-effect specification. All time-invariant 
controls are now captured by the village dummies, hence we are left with our only 
variable of interest; the conditional effect of coffee prices on the probability of 
recruitment. Also, the sample is nearly cut in half, dropping villages that do not 
change over time. The coefficient, though still not significant, is however not much 
affected.  
 
In Column (5) and (6) we check whether (past) violence is related to recruitment. The 
number of deaths as a result of violence was reported by the village leader for each 
year between 1993 and 2005. We can therefore use it in our panel estimates, although 
we of course realize that this variable is also based on recall.  
 
We find that once we control for village and year fixed effects there is no significant 
effect of deaths on the likelihood of recruitment. This tentatively suggests that 
equating violence with recruitment may be inappropriate if one wants to explain 
recruitment. Given the low correlation between violence and recruitment we take the 
view that, in our context, violence does not proxy recruitment. We then subsequently 
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test whether an increase in the world market price of coffee (instead of the producer 
price) leads to more violence at the village level. The intuition is as follows: the 
producer price of coffee in Burundi hardly follows changes in world market prices. 
Therefore, positive rents would accrue to the government if the world market price 
would increase.8 The growing government revenues would make it more attractive to 
fight, either to preserve the status quo (elites) or to change the status quo by 
overthrowing the government (rebels).9 The result is presented in column (7). An 
increase in the world market price of coffee has no effect on violence.   
 
5.2 Rainfall shocks and recruitment 
Here we examine whether recruitment could also result from (negative) weather 
shocks, as implied by the literature (Miguel et al., 2004). We construct a 13-year 
panel for the years 1993-2005 using data on recruitment activities based on recall 
questions from our community survey. We focus on negative rainfall shocks. In 
Burundi, more than 95 percent of the rural population depends on rain-fed agriculture 
as an important source of income. Miguel et al., (2004) have shown that negative 
income shocks (instrumented by annual rainfall growth) increases the likelihood of 
civil war the next year. The results are presented in column 8.10 We find that a 
negative income shock is associated with an increased likelihood of recruitment. This 
suggests that the opportunity-cost mechanism may indeed be at work.  
 
6 Conclusions    
The paper tests two popular hypotheses to explain recruitment activities during the 
Burundian civil. We use new village-level data to analyze the effects of historical 
grievances, reduced opportunity costs and rent-seeking incentives on the probability 
of recruitment activities. The cross-sectional analyses report no effect of grievance on 
the likelihood of recruitment.  
 
By contrast, they do show tentative support for the idea that reduced opportunity costs 
may promote recruitment. Villages that had above mean incidents of ‘insufficient 
                                                 
8 An alternative explanation could be that grievances over the large divergence lead to conflict. This 
however would require farmers to have information about the world market price. This is unlikely to be the 
case for Burundian farmers.   
9 We assume that rents are not redistributed but only kept for private gains. The large divergence between 
the world market price and the price paid to Burundian producers offer some support for this assumption.    
10 The random effects models show similar results. They are not reported but available upon request.  
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rain’ were more likely to have recruitment activities than others. We also use recall 
information on recruitment to construct a 13-year panel and assess whether exogenous 
drops in the producer price of coffee increase the probability of recruitment. The 
coefficient is negative as we would expect, and in most specifications close to being 
significant at 10 percent. This at the very minimum suggests that poverty or the 
opportunity costs of time indeed play a role in recruitment decisions, provided that 
recruitment is voluntary. By contrast, negative income shocks through adverse 
weather conditions are a very strong predictor of recruitment. This finding is 
consistent with a recent conclusion from the civil war literature: commodity price 
shocks show no robust relationship with civil war violence while weather shocks do.  
 
However, we caution against a somewhat common routine to equate recruitment with 
violence. Including measures of violence in our regressions showed that they were not 
(robustly) associated with recruitment. This speaks against the idea that recruitment 
and violence are one and the same and impact on each other. In fact, several scholars 
have argued that joining a rebel group may be a rational choice to ensure protection 
from violence (Goodwin, 2001; Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007). We however cannot rule 
out the alternative explanation that our binary indicator for recruitment is simply too 
coarse to identify the true relation.  Lastly, reduced opportunity costs may be one of 
the potentially many mechanisms at work, and that results do not necessarily extend 
beyond the context of Burundi. The majority of people will not risk their life, but 
some do. Individual data is needed to complement aggregate sub-or cross-national 
studies. Fortunately, several scholars are now taking up this challenging task.  
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Figure 1 Annual development of (real) coffee prices (1990 BUF) 
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Table 1: Producer Price in Burundi and World Market Price for Arabica Coffee 
Year Nominal 
price 
 
World 
Price in 
US $ 
per Kg 
Consumer 
Price 
Index 
 
Real 
Produce
r Price 
Exchange 
Rate BuF-
US$ 
Real 
World 
Price in 
BuF 
% of 
World 
Price to 
Producers 
1991/9
2 175 1,86 104,5 167,46 208,3 372,30 44,98 
1992/9
3 175 1,40 114,6 152,71 242,8 298,49 51,16 
1993/9
4 180 1,55 131,7 136,67 252,7 298,69 45,76 
1994/9
5 180 3,30 157,2 114,5 249,8 524,52 21,83 
1995/9
6 240 3,32 198,7 120,79 302,8 506,74 23,84 
1996/9
7 290 2,68 260,6 111,28 352,4 363,57 30,61 
1997/9
8 330 4,15 293,1 112,59 447,8 635,46 17,72 
1998/9
9 420 2,97 303,1 138,57 536,6 526,69 26,31 
99/200
0 450 2,28 376,7 119,46 720,5 437,19 27,32 
2000/0
1 450 1,91 411,8 109,28 830,4 386,27 28,29 
2001/0
2 450 1,37 430,3 104,58 930,7 296,35 35,29 
2002/0
3 450 1,35 476,4 94,458 1083 307,77 30,69 
2003/0
4 450 1,41 514,5 87,464 1110 304,716 28,7 
2004/0
5 500 1,77 583,4 85,704 998 302,84 28,3 
2005/0
6 900 2,52 637,6 141,15 1050 416,13 33,92 
2006/0
7 1500 3,06 729,4 205,65 1000 422,26 48,7 
Source : Kimonyo and Ntiranyibagira (2007, p.9), Burundi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2007) 
and authors own calculations. 
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Table 2 Descriptives 
Variable Mean Std.dev. Observations 
Panel A: Village characteristics 
Dummy for negative rainfall shocks above sample mean 0.60 0.49 100 
Annual deviation from long-term average rainfall 0.01 0.28 100 
% Mothers literate in village 0.34 0.18 100 
log Distance to the capital (km) 4.37 0.39 100 
log Population density in 1990 5.38 0.51 100 
log Altitude (m) 7.37 0.75 100 
Dummy for Coffee area 0.83 0.37 100 
Main road in village (0/1) 0.13 0.34 100 
Distance to nearest market (scale 1-7) 2.67 0.83 100 
Distance to nearest drinking water facility scale (1-7) 1.62 0.61 100 
Distance to health nearest health center (scale 1-7) 3.21 0.90 100 
% Votes for Ndadaye 60.53 17.83 100 
Panel B: Civil war variables 
Dummy for historical grievances 0.08 0.27 100 
Dummy for recruitment 0.50 0.50 100 
# Deaths resulting from civil war violence 56.1 114.31 100 
Panel C: Economic variables 
Producer price of coffee in year t (real 1990 Burundi Francs) 120.15 - 100 
World market price of coffee in year t (real 1990 Burundi 
Francs) 
409.23 - 100 
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Table 3 cross-section models of ‘grievance and ‘reduced opportunity costs’ for recruitment at the 
village level 
  
Grievance 
 
 
Grievance 
 
Opportunity 
 
Opportunity 
 
 
Both 
 
 
Both 
Dependent: recruitment (0/1) ML ML ML ML ML ML 
       
Village attacked in 1972/1988 -0.272* -0.257   -0.240 -0.294 
 (0.162) (0.231)   (0.250) (0.238) 
Above mean drought    0.250** 0.236* 0.229* 0.298** 
   (0.098) (0.129) (0.130) (0.135) 
Mother is literate  -0.029  -0.219 -0.133 -0.080 
  (0.371)  (0.363) (0.378) (0.413) 
Distance to capital (log)  0.012  -0.036 0.020 0.145 
  (0.228)  (0.219) (0.227) (0.243) 
Population  (log)  -0.210  -0.254* -0.233 -0.268 
  (0.155)  (0.154) (0.158) (0.170) 
Altitude (log)  -1.054  -0.760 -0.835 -1.019 
  (0.719)  (0.747) (0.746) (0.790) 
Coffee region  0.305*  0.236 0.263 0.387** 
  (0.176)  (0.194) (0.188) (0.170) 
Main road  -0.149  -0.226 -0.205 -0.222 
  (0.206)  (0.197) (0.201) (0.226) 
Distance to market  -0.069  -0.037 -0.047 -0.043 
  (0.089)  (0.092) (0.093) (0.097) 
Distance to drinking water facility  0.107  0.087 0.067 0.051 
  (0.133)  (0.132) (0.132) (0.135) 
Distance to health centre  -0.082  -0.088 -0.088 -0.104 
  (0.081)  (0.081) (0.082) (0.088) 
Votes for Ndadaye  0.014***  0.016*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
# Deaths in village      0.007** 
      (0.003) 
Log-likelihood -68.18 -50.61 -66.28 -49.52 -49.13 -44.33 
Pseudo-R2 0.02 0.21 0.04 0.23 0.24 0.31 
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All models are estimated using Maximum Likelihood. Marginal effects reported at mean values.  
  20
 
Table 4 Panel regressions for recruitment and the producer price of coffee 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ML ML ML ML ML ML OLS ML 
        
Pt*Coffee regions -3.778 -3.926§ -3.469 -3.988§ -3.776§ -5.315§   
 (2.707) (2.720) (2.801) (2.738) (2.774) (3.361)   
Pwpt* Coffee regions       3.168  
       (51.852)  
Coffee regions 18.435 19.230 17.145      
 (12.931) (12.998) (13.389)      
Rainfall shocks        -1.627***
        (0.483) 
Population (log)  -0.072 -0.080      
  (0.346) (0.339)      
Altitude (log)  -1.097 -0.992      
  (1.772) (1.688)      
Distance to capital (log)  -0.824 -0.970*      
  (0.542) (0.516)      
Main road  0.045 0.525      
  (0.502) (0.516)      
Distance to market  -0.346 -0.262      
  (0.217) (0.204)      
Distance to drinking water 
facility 
 0.333 0.303      
  (0.290) (0.277)      
Distance to health centre  0.346* 0.239      
  (0.202) (0.193)      
Votes for Ndadaye   0.030***      
   (0.009)      
# Deaths in village t     0.004    
     (0.003)    
# Deaths in village t-1      0.003   
      (0.003)   
Constant -26.931*** 
(9.962) 
8.969 
(13.817) 
6.758 
(13.076) 
     
Village FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1188 1176 1116 660 660 572 1200 512 
Log-likelihood -412.20 -392.06 -369.58 -233.66 -232.19 -201.11  -171.26 
Pseudo-R2       0.03 0.07 
2χ  19.39*** 36.06** 45.56*** 40.84*** 43.80***
* 
42.42***   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 §p<0.12 Columns (1)-(3) are random 
effects logit models. Column (4) (5) and (6) present conditional fixed effects results. Column (7) is estimated 
with OLS.  Dependent is 1 if recruitment activities took place in village j in year t and 0 otherwise, except in 
column (7) where the dependent is the # of deaths in village j in year t.  The model on rainfall (column 8) 
includes standard errors clustered at the province level to correct for intra-group correlation.   
 
